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Conception of a Control Unit for Critical Systems
Marek Sałamaj
Abstract—The article regards critical systems precisely con-
trolled by safety units. A new idea of safety logic microcontroller
is proposed. It is built on the basis of the simplest mechanisms and
technical solutions. This approach allowed to obtain a complex
decision-making and control microsystem, in which the applied
mechanisms and solutions increased its reliability. As a result, the
proposed control unit proved to be a universal solution, which
can be used in any critical system.
Keywords—Safety logic microcontroller, critical systems,
master-slave architecture, FPGA, conception
I. INTRODUCTION
THE current standard of living, as well as the industryrequires constant progress and automation of various
technical solutions that surround us. The continuous process
of their upgrading and extension is a reason for creation of
ever newer and much more specialized control units, which
are able to control and manage them. Such type of technical
solutions combined with managing them control units form the
specialized technical devices, which generally are identified as
real-time systems [1]–[3].
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Fig. 1. The block diagram of a BML conception.
Real-time systems are used in various domains where they
perform some specified actions in an automated way. An
example of such system can be a very simple system used
in a guarded paid parking lot. Various types of equipment are
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here connected together – a specific group of sensors (pho-
tocells, timers), executing units (entry and exit gate) and the
most important control unit (logic controller, microcontroller,
computer). In this case, the conditional payment of a fee causes
the control unit to open the entrance gate to the parking lot,
otherwise the entrance gate remains closed. Therefore, any
damage of the control unit managing gates functionality can
result in a situation when a gate is permanently closed or open.
Then, the vehicles are allowed to enter the parking lot without
any restrictions, or the same parking is blocked and cannot
make profits until the fault has been noticed, identified and
removed by the technical support team. Response time of the
technical support team is not limited, and the possible delay
only leads to financial losses, which have to be calculated into
in the functioning of the system (parking lot).
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Fig. 2. The modes of the work of a BML unit.
Currently, real-time systems are used in almost every do-
main that is surrounding us, but also in critical applications.
They are being used more and more in military and civilian
critical real-time systems, which often are referred to as critical
systems [3]–[7]. The word critical means here, that all included
elements should definitely meet all the rigorous requirements
for such systems. In addition, this type of elements should
be reliable (faultless), because any error in their functioning
could lead to the risk of human life, environmental pollution
or to some financial losses. Therefore, critical systems must
be supported (controlled and diagnosed) by specialized safety
control units.
II. SAFETY CONTROL UNIT
Because of the fact that in each critical system all sensors
and actuators (objects) are usually managed by a single control
unit, the unit becomes responsible for monitoring (diagnosing)
the correctness of their operation. Therefore, it is necessary
to create newer control and diagnose unit solutions that
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would be able to correctly manage any objects regardless
of the operating conditions (environment). Depending on the
complexity and functionality of critical systems, such units
can be represented by specialized processors, logic controllers,
microcontrollers or computers, provided that they are safe [6],
[8]–[11]. In this case, the safety of control unit has to be
understood as the trouble-free functionality (operating). It can
be obtained by applying to a control unit various mechanisms
and technical solutions significantly increasing the reliability.
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Fig. 3. Conception of a Halang-S´niez˙ek controller.
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Fig. 4. Conception of a Adamski-Sałamaj controller.
An example of a safety control unit is the proposed and
implemented Safety Logic Microcontroller (BML) [6], [7],
which can be used as a safety system for critical applications
[12] (depicted in Fig. 1). This system (BML) can be adapted to
manage any critical system, managing i.e. traffic lights or long-
range rockets. A correctly working BML unit should control
the subordinate objects according to the design assumptions
regarding the control unit itself as well as corresponding
elements of critical system. If any fault (error) is detected in
the BML control unit (or in the system), it should make the
functionality of the whole system safe.
Reliable work of the system after a failure enforces switch-
ing the control unit into a safety mode (Fig. 2) and activating
the appropriate alarm signalization. The signalization should
force the user to increase the patience, pay special attention or
take some specific actions. As a result, the stuck and turned
into safety mode unit (the whole critical system) is waiting
for technical support team that can diagnose and remove
the cause of the failure. Very fast error detection and its
identification in the BML system is obtained by automating the
switching of operation mode from working (normal) mode into
safety (critical) mode (Fig. 2). This type of automation in the
BML system at the current level of technological complexity
is crucial and necessary, because any delay in reaction to
a detected fault, or even the lack of it, can lead to serious
consequences. Then, any delay in safety mode functionality
could lead to a threat to human life, environmental pollution or
to specific financial losses. For this reason, human interaction
is completely eliminated from the process of critical system
management to make the system operate much more efficiently
and faster responding to occurring events. Therefore it is
necessary to use in control units of critical systems the ever-
increasing amount of various mechanisms and technical solu-
tions, that will enhance their computing capabilities in terms
of identification and interpretation of errors and failures. In
the proposed BML system the above mentioned characteristics
have been successfully significantly improved.
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Fig. 5. Details of an BML architecture.
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III. SAFETY LOGIC MICROCONTROLLER
It is very important that technical solutions used in var-
ious domains are continuously extended, modernized and
improved. Therefore, the researches regarding a new concept
of Safety Logic Microcontroller (BML) architecture [6], [7]
are still going on in the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering at
the University of Zielona Go´ra. The studies were initiated by
Halang-S´niez˙ek (Fig. 3) in the safety logic controller approach
[8]–[10] and then extended by Adamski-Sałamaj (Fig. 4) [6],
[7].
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Fig. 6. Architecture of a MASTER processor.
The BML system has been designed so far to be used in the
critical real-time systems [9], [13]–[16] and to control them
with much higher precision and reliability in comparison to
standard solutions. The BML system is designed as a 32-
bit control unit, where the three-processor MASTER-SLAVE
architecture (Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7) [8], [9], [11], [14], [15]
with all necessary functional modules is fully implemented
in a single reprogrammable structure of FPGA (Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array) [17] (depicted in Fig. 5). On the other
hand, commonly used logic controllers and microcontrollers
are implemented on the basis on the processor placed in the
vicinity of various functional modules (depicted in Fig. 8).
Additionally, the realization of the BML unit in a repro-
grammable FPGA structure (as opposed to standard logic
controllers) helped to implement in its architecture some spe-
cific solutions and mechanisms that finally quite significantly
increased the safety and reliability level. The goal during
the BML implementation was to make the proposed system
meet rigorous requirements for units used in critical systems
[18], in terms of construction and functioning principles. As
a result, a new conception of the BML unit was proposed and
implemented, prepared on the basis of a number of unusual,
yet innovative technical solutions.
When considering the safety systems design it should be
noticed, that it has never been and it will not ever be possible
to propose and implement a completely safe control unit
(including the BML). A state of absolute safety [8]–[10],
and the more a state of extreme and total reliability of the
system, is impossible to achieve in terms of implementation
technology, as in the real environment the system functionality
may be anytime undesirably disturbed. On the other hand, the
implementation of safety systems (including the BML) with
another methods and tools supported by the latest technologies
and CAD-solutions, allows only for their precise realization,
but not for protection against errors or faults in the function-
ality. Therefore, by the BML functioning principles it is taken
into account that it can work in any of two possible modes
of operation: in safety mode or in normal mode [6], [7], [9]
(Fig. 2).
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Fig. 7. Architecture of a SLAVE processor.
The BML normal mode defines in details all the desired
patterns of unit behavior after changes of logical states that
can occur on its inputs. These patterns are initially defined
in the early design phase (when assumptions are made), and
then reflected in the hardware and software of an implemented
control unit. Whenever the BML system detects an error
in the functionality while automatically self-diagnosing, it is
immediately switched from the normal mode into the critical
mode – the so-called safety state [6], [7], [9], [10], [14]. The
safety state of a device is a state where in an extreme situation
all its outputs (in this case BML’s outputs) have assigned
some strictly specified logical states dependent on the real-time
critical system which manage the device. Switching working
mode of the BML from the critical mode (the safety state)
into the normal mode requires in turn an outside intervention
of the technical support team which will diagnose the reason
why the control of the system was stopped.
The BML unit was designed in such a way, that if necessary,
it can initialize an internal change from normal mode into
critical mode in case of detected:
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• construction faults (structure),
• errors connected with data processing (algorithm),
• random errors,
• errors caused by external factors (noise).
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Fig. 8. The block diagram of a logical controller.
In this case, construction faults that may occur in the
process of safety system design can be effectively detected
and eliminated using various methods. Therefore, these faults
do not threaten the critical system functionality so much as
random errors or errors caused by external factors in the
place of its (later) usage. This is why safety systems are
designed in such a way that they operate correctly in real-time
according to the design assumptions. Moreover, they should
on-the-fly automatically and without any unnecessary delays
detect hardware and software faults or errors and be resistant
to external factors. In this way the experimental model of the
BML unit was designed and implemented.
Implementation of measuring and recording devices which
use in the architecture reconfigurable structures of the FPGA-
type (as it is in the BML system) is much more expensive
than universal solutions using programmable logic controllers.
In spite of high costs of realization of such devices, using the
FPGAs offers incomparably much more technical possibilities
of implemented hardware. The reason for this is the rapid
progress of computer science and electronics in the field of
reconfigurable structures, which allowed in recent years to
implement in a single FPGA not only single-processor solu-
tions, but even complex decision-making and control systems.
Thus, short development time and implementation simplicity
of measuring and recording devices using FPGAs is only
limited by the engineer’s imagination and the need to adjust
the signal levels of the control unit (current and voltage) to
external extension modules and sensors.
IV. DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS
At the initial stage of new conception development and
safety logic microcontroller (BML) design, some main project
assumptions were specified. They allowed to focus on the
particular research area. It was inter alia assumed, that:
• BML unit is a single-unit solution implemented com-
pletely in a single reconfigurable structure of FPGA
type (low costs, great hardware possibilities, prototyping
speed),
• BML unit is a reconfigurable unit, where program can
be changed on-line (unlike the Halang-S´niez˙ek solution
adapted to particular usage) – a much more flexible
solution in comparison to Halang-S´niez˙ek solution,
• BML unit has i.e. only one common power supply
(safety is increased at unit conception level, and not on
construction level, like in Halang-S´niez˙ek solution),
• considering the functionality, BML unit conception
should be similar to Halang-S´niez˙ek unit conception,
• safety level of BML unit with various mechanisms and
technical solutions should be possibly high,
• there is a compromise between BML unit complexity and
unit methods ensuring safety of its work.
V. STRUCTURE AND PHYSICAL REALIZATION OF BML
UNIT
BML unit was proposed as a three-processor decision
module, where three independent and separated processors are
connected in MASTER-SLAVE configuration [8], [9], [11],
[14], [15] and precisely cooperate. Components of proposed
unit (Fig. 5) communicate with each other using the inside
implemented safe asynchronous communication protocol of
Handshake type.
Control processor MASTER (Fig. 6) and computational
processor SLAVE (Fig. 7) are based on Harvard architecture
processors. In this case, their structure was initially verified.
Then it was reduced to necessary elements. Therefore, the
processors could be provided with additional safety solutions.
As the result, three locally separated and independent syn-
chronous computational units (GALS technology – Globally
Asynchronous Locally Synchronous [13], [16], [19]) were
distinguished inside the BML structure by the processors.
Usage of additional function blocks was necessary to ensure
the correct functionality of these blocks.
TABLE I
THE RESULTS OF THE SYNTHESIS OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF BML –
OPTIMIZATION: AREA
BLOCK F-F Latch 4 input LUTs F
CLK
Gates
SEQ M1 36 – 513 184,3 MHz 3563
SEQ M2 170 – 1007 35,6 MHz 7519
SEQ S 40 – 429 300,3 MHz 3141
MASTER1 140 – 592 46,4 MHz 5803
MASTER2 244 – 1329 26,6 MHz 11202
SLAVE 204 – 3182 30,3 MHz 23727
BML 939 1255 6437 26,6 MHz 58403
Various types of memory – RAMM1, RAMM2, RAMS and
ROM can be classified as additional function blocks (used to
physically separate data and program), as well as asynchronous
comparators and coupling (matching) units with very simple
structure and functioning rules. In contrast to used RAM data
memory, the ROM program memory was used as a two-
ports memory. It is shared between two concurrently working
MASTER control processors and has two independent address
spaces.
Both address spaces have exactly the same BML control
program, but are individually served by different control
processors MASTER1 or MASTER2. RAMS data memory
together with input register REG IN and output register
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TABLE II
THE RESULTS OF THE SYNTHESIS OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF BML –
OPTIMIZATION: SPEED
BLOCK F-F Latch 4 input LUTs F
CLK
Gates
SEQ M1 36 – 539 424,4 MHz 3674
SEQ M2 186 – 1126 115,5 MHz 8487
SEQ S 40 – 426 492,5 MHz 3001
MASTER1 182 – 841 83,2 MHz 7468
MASTER2 289 – 1643 59,1 MHz 13419
SLAVE 299 – 4354 57,4 MHz 31940
BML 1035 1255 7782 56,9 MHz 67610
REG OUT as input-output ports was adapted to commu-
nication with external executing devices. Control unit veri-
fies on the fly all received signals with information about
correct/incorrect functionality of chosen components of the
BML structure. Whenever an error inside any component is
reported, then control unit immediately changes the BML work
mode into safety mode, where previously defined logic states
values of all output ports are set. Cycle controller generates
in this case only signals, which initialize the safety system.
Additionally it informs control unit about critical delays in
decision system functionality.
Fig. 9. A model of crossroads.
Various simple, but also specialized in a particular do-
main technical solutions were used inside the BML unit. It
was a motivation for further researches on its structure and
functioning rules in the real physical environment. Therefore,
a new conception of BML unit was successfully completely
implemented in a reconfigurable structure of FPGA type,
namely in VIRTEX-II PRO device of XC2VP30 type with
VIRTEX-II PRO device of 94V-00523 type of the XILINX
company. The whole synthesis process of proposed solution
(BML) was performed successfully without any problems,
taking into account both available optimization types. Partial
results of synthesis process are presented in Tab. I and Tab. II.
VI. TEST OF PROTOTYPE UNIT
Safety Logic Microcontroller unit has been designed and
physically made to control various critical real-time systems.
The implementation of this unit in a reconfigurable structure of
FPGA (device: VIRTEX-II PRO FPGA type XC2VP30 with
VIRTEX-II PRO type 94V-0 0523 XILINX [17]) allowed to
test his work in the physical environment.
In this case, a critical system used in the explorations was
represented by a model of crossroads. This mock-up was
prepared on the pattern of the intersection of two multi-
lane roads with traffic lights, which the view is shown in
(Fig. 9). In this proposed system (in the model), traffic light
of the intersection was managed by BML unit, which main
task was only controlled the turning on and off lights in
proper sequence. Arrangement of elements of traffic lights on
the layout crossroads is shown in (Fig. 9). In this particular
application, the control unit (BML) did not collect and verified
any information from the system, but only controlled it. By
reason of it, the control system of the intersection realized
only specified control algorithm and analyzed the correctness
of the work of safety unit. The main and most important task
of BML unit was to manage the traffic lights so that traffic
of cars on the model of intersection was smooth and grade-
separated. Therefore, in the work of the considered system are
specified four major drive cycles, which details are shown in
(Fig. 10).
4th CYCLE3rd CYCLE
2nd CYCLE1st CYCLE
Fig. 10. Four major drive cycles on the crossroads.
According to the concept of the BML, this unit can operate
in one of two possible states of the work: in the normal
state and in the critical condition. In the normal state, the
control unit (which was used to manage critical system of
traffic lights) can operate only in two modes: day and night
mode. During the day mode, the BML unit turns on and off
a threecolor traffic lights at the crossroads to obtain street
traffic in accordance with the cycles as shown in (Fig. 10).
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Cycles occur one after another. However in the night mode,
the same microcontroller turns on and off only yellow blinking
lights. The automatic switch between a day and nigh mode
can only appear, while signal from both sensor or clock
programmed by technical service was occurred. In this case,
the day and the night mode determines the status of the normal
operation of the BML unit. Accidentally, the critical state, in
the same system coincides with the night mode in the normal
state of the BML work. Depending on the time of day, the
safety microcontroller switches the state of his work between
day and night mode, according to the algorithm shown in
(Fig. 11). However, every little mistake, an anomaly, defect or
failure of the BML work immediately switches its state from
the normal state to the critical state. In this case of critical
state, blinking yellow lights warning about occurring system
failure and street traffic is determined based on traffic signs.
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Fig. 11. Algorithm of work of the BML unit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed Safety Logic Microcontroller (BML) is cer-
tainly not the only one system that can be used to manage crit-
ical systems. However, a wide range of various implemented
solutions and mechanisms allowed the control unit to become
much more efficient and function much more precisely than
previously used systems. Furthermore, the proposed control
unit is quite well protected against the occurrence of various
types of faults and errors, and thus it is much more safe (fault-
free). Increased safety level in the BML was obtained thanks to
the detailed optimization and significant simplification of the
complexity of technical solutions implemented in its structure.
The process of simplification of the BML system involved
mainly its whole architecture, as well as all the architectures
of specialized function processors. In this way, the complexity
of the final BML version has become so simple that its work
(functionality) can be easily controlled. According to design
assumptions, the proposed system was supposed to be and
it is the most versatile (standard) solution adapted for use
in a variety of critical systems in which BML’s functionality
depends entirely on the program execution.
In summary, safety units for managing of critical systems
must be continuously extended and innovated. It can be
confirmed by the fact that various fields of industry and
everyday life are dynamically changing. Therefore, a very
rapid technological progress of our civilization requires that
decision-making and control units should be created that
would be able (in the future) to manage the more complex
and well-developed critical systems.
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